In relationships between integrated e-commerce platform operators and integrated platforms, control over connectivity, display, data access, and termination of integration may directly affect market access. This study distinguishes four legal statuses: integrated e-commerce platforms, large digital platforms, dominant undertakings, and undertakings controlling market access. Based on Vietnam’s 2025 Law on E-Commerce, the 2018 Law on Competition, and the European Union’s gatekeeper designation mechanism, the study proposes a service-specific two-stage identification approach combining quantitative screening with assessment of gateway function, significant dependence, and the durability of control. It also recommends establishing designation procedures, rights of explanation, protection of business secrets, periodic review, and a complementary relationship between this proposed legal status and competition law.
Keywords
integrated e-commerce platformmarket access controllarge digital platformgatekeeping powerdigital competition
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