Separating the positions of chairperson of the board of directors and chief executive officer in joint stock companies: Toward substantive independence
Published: August 10, 2026
Abstract
Abstract:
This study analyzes the rule separating the positions of chairperson of the board of directors and director or chief executive officer in Vietnamese joint stock companies. Using doctrinal legal analysis, literature review, and comparison with international corporate governance standards, the study clarifies the function and limitations of this rule. The findings show that prohibiting dual office-holding helps prevent executive self-monitoring but does not automatically ensure the board’s substantive independence. Power continuity may remain when a former chief executive officer becomes board chair and continues to influence the new executive and supervisory process. The study recommends maintaining the current scope of the separation requirement while strengthening disclosure and explanation obligations, enhancing the role of independent board members, and introducing a lead independent director mechanism to improve board oversight.
Keywords
corporate governanceCEO dualityboard leadership structureboard independencelead independent director
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